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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION: 
1.1! STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: 
1,,,amb producers are usually in business to try and maximise profits, and want to know 
what grades of lamb to produce in order to do this. They want to know what type of lamb 
will be in most demand in the foreseeable future, what the target market is in terms of 
carcase composition and weight, and which company is likely to offer the highest prices 
for each grade of lamb. 
Producers normally have to rely on price differentials in grading schedules as a 
stimulant to change, but the extent to which schedule price differentials indicate 
differences in market demand for different lamb grades is not clear. Price differentials are 
often confused and weakened by many factors in the marketing chain. Consequently, they 
may fall short in getting a clear message about consumer requirements to the producer in 
order to stimulate change. 
Recently there have been numerous articles printed in New Zealand farming magazines 
stating that farmers don't know what grade of lamb the exporter wants, including those 
by Shadbolt et al. (1985), Butler (1986), and Cross (1986). Lamb schedule prices may 
change during the season and farmers may try and keep stock on the property in order to 
finish them at a heavier weight or better grade, and therefore obtain a higher price, only to 
find that the schedule price has dropped by the time the lambs are slaughtered. Many 
farmers are calling for meat exporters to make their schedules available earlier in the 
season, however in most cases this is not occurring. 
Inefficiencies in the pricing mechanism inhibit the rapid and accurate transmission of 
changes in supply and demand from one market level to another. The failure of exporters 
to set schedule prices that accurately depict the demand for lamb, leads to production 
decisions being made by producers that result in misallocation of resources, and a 
subsequent loss of economic efficiency. There have been few attempts to study the nature 
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of price transmissions, and no previous research has examined if the schedule price paid 
to farmers, are indicative of the prices received by exporters for a specified grade of lamb. 
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PAPER: 
The purpose of this paper is to study the marketing margins for different export grades 
of famb in'order to determine if schedule prices paid to producers give an adequate 
representation of the export prices received by exporters. This will be achieved by 
review'ing the recent history of the New Zealand lamb industry and the lamb grading 
system in order to gain a better understanding of the current New Zealand situation. 
Marketing margins will then be discussed and relevant previous research examined. An 
attempt will be made to develop an econometric model for various lamb grade margins, 
in order to examine hypotheses proposed about their behaviour. Results will be reported 
and interpreted, and their implications discussed. 
3 
Chapter2 
MARKETING MARGINS AND LAMB GRADES; 
2.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW ZEALAND LAMB INDUSTRY: 
The majority of lamb produced on New Zealand farms is destined for export markets. 
In recent years over 90% of New Zealand lamb has been exported. To gain a better 
understanding of the role exporters have in determining schedule prices, recent 
developments in the New Zealand meat industry must be discussed. 
Over the last 20 years there have been significant schedule price fluctuations which 
have resulted in the perceived need for price support and smoothing policies. For the 
period from 1954 to 1972, this was mainly through a New Zealand Meat Producer Board 
(N.Z.M.P.B). fund which was obtained from revenue diverted from the pre 1954 bulk 
purchase contract which had been running with the United Kingdom. These reserves 
however quickly became run down and the need for an alternative method of funding 
became apparent. 
As a result, in 1972 the government and the N.Z.M.P.B. agreed on a new stabilization 
scheme, and the government subsequently introduced the Supplementary Minimum Price 
(S.M.P.) scheme to further smooth farm prices and farmers incomes. The government 
claimed that S.M.P.s meant farmers would plan and invest in production knowing in 
advance the minimum prices they would receive in the next few seasons, and that this 
knowledge would allow the agricultural sector to play its full part in generating export led 
growth. In later years an objective of the scheme was also to help provide the farmer with 
adequate income. The scheme was paid for by the taxpayer and was withdrawn in early 
1984 although some payments continued until the end of the 1984-85 killing season, and 
to some extent it can be blamed for some of the current industry problems (Griffith and 
Martin 1988). 
During the early 1980's there was considerable disagreement between exporting firms 
as to what was a realistic price level for meat. This problem can be seen as one of the 
major reasons as to .why in 1982, the government imposed statutory control, and the New 
Zealand Meat Producers Board assumed complete control over the export marketing of 
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4 
sheepmeat. The result was a single selling environment and many companies changed the 
emphasis of their operations. As further processing was not controlled by the board, 
companies withdrew resources from carcass marketing activities and concentrated on the 
processing and marketing of by products, and the development of further processed 
products. Generally, further processing consisted of boned or boneless consumer cuts, 
although some companies were involved in activities that required a higher degree of 
further processing, such as reformed meats and canned meats. Not all of these further 
processed meats proved to be successful and many companies have recently reviewed and 
refined their approaches to the further processing of sheepmeat products (Zwart and 
Martin 1988). 
By 1985 it was apparent that the Meat Board control of the meat industry had created 
more costs than benefits. In December 1985 the Meat Board handed control of meat 
exporting back over to the private companies on the condition that an orderly and 
coordinated approach was established and adhered too. During 1985 the government also 
reduced, and then removed S.M.P.'s. With the removal of these support programmes, 
meat prices fell drastically. and this is one of the major reasons why lamb production has 
fallen over the last few years. 
In 1985 Meat Board control of the meat export industry ended. In order to reach the 
condition of an orderly and disciplined approach the Meat Industry Association (M.I.A.) 
was formed where competing companies come together to discuss and action matters of 
mutual concern. All exporting companies belong to one of five groups with each group 
having representatives on a marketing committee of the M.I.A. A meat industry plan is 
developed by the M.I.A. with each company being required to provide a marketing plan 
indicating anticipated quantities to be marketed in individual countries. The structure is 
essentially a voluntary cartel which has resulted in a high level of coordination for the 
marketing of carcass meats. The marketing of further processed meats is not covered by 
these arrangements. 
The M.I.A. coordinates individual marketing plans for individual markets using a 
complex allocative procedure to allocate meats. A simple example of this .procedure is the 
work of the Meat Marketing Corporation (M.M.C.), which controls .meat flows to some 
5 
of the single buyer and disposal markets. Individual firm contributions to these markets is 
decided on a pro-rata basis (the share of a particular market is dependent upon each 
country's proportion of the net kill). While other less formal arrangements exist in other 
markets, there are plans to develop a more sophisticated control mechanism for the 
United Kingdom market. 
The processing and marketing operations for lamb in New Zealand are two separate 
functions, although they are totally reliant on each other. The processor does not 
necessarily own the meat although he may own and market other products such as skin, 
wool and hides.The exporter owns the meat and is responsible for exporting it. Many 
companies both process and export meat. 
The New Zealand Meat Act (1981) is administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, and deals with such matters as the licensing of meat processing plants, packing 
houses and abattoirs, for both domestic and export processing and inspection. It embodies 
an "open door policy" which gives farmers statutory access to the works of their choice. 
To obtain a licence processing plants and packing houses must comply with hygiene 
requirements and local authority by laws. One of the requirements of the New Zealand 
Meat Act is that killing and processing charges are set regardless of market place results. 
Fifty seven processing plants operate in New Zealand with licences to export owned by 
27 companies, therefore the environment is very competitive. There are 66 licensed meat 
exporters which may also own proceessing plants, with the majority of processing and 
exporting being done by a few large companies (N.Z. Meat Industry Association, 1989). 
The exporter arranges for the processor to process, cut and pack meat according to the 
specifications for the customer. 
With the removal of meat industry control in 1985, individual exporting companies 
resumed ownership of meat and started to produce their own schedules, in which they 
state the schedule prices paid to farmers. "The exporter sets a buying schedule according 
to anticipated realisations and with regard to competition" (N.Z. Meat Industry 
Association, 1989). When lamb grades are in high demand, companies often pay a 
premium. Most operators publish their buying prices in newspapers and their company 
news letters and recently, at least one private company has started to issue publications 
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6 
containing many companies schedule prices. The New Zealand Meat Producers Board 
still retains the right to issue its own schedule of meat export prices when exporters offer 
prices it considers to be too low, as happened in the period from 1982 to 1985, however 
this is not currently occurring. This would involve the board not only setting schedule 
prices, but also arranging for the overseas marketing of various products. 
Producers can sell their export meat on schedule, on a pool account system, on the 
hoof, or through a particular cooperative. In marketing through company pools, producers 
receive an advance payment of approximately 90% of the schedule price, with the 
possibility of receiving an end pool payment if a surplus is achieved. Currently it is not 
known how much meat is sold in pools, and as no data exists on pooled lamb returns, this 
study will only examine margins on the export meat sold by schedule. 
Since September 1985, there have been no government intervention mechanisms which . 
stabilise, support, or otherwise modify prices paid to producers, and therefore farmers 
incomes have not been stabilised or supported. For this reason this study is only 
concerned with the period since September 1985, when individual companies have been 
free to set schedule prices without government intervention. Although the M.I.A. 
coordinates the marketing plans for individual companies, companies are free to produce 
their own schedule prices which they do. In order to understand fully the nature of the 
market meat grades, their specifications must first be discussed. 
2.1.2. LAMB GRADES: 
In New Zealand a standard system of classifying grades of meat is used. These grades 
were radically changed in the 1983-84 slaughter season and smaller revisions have been 
made since then. Export meat is graded according to the type of animal, weight, age, and 
fat content, with the grades being established by the New Zealand Meat Producers Board. 
When individual companies desire more precise lamb specifications then the Meat Board 
grading schedules give, companies may set their own grades, such as Waitaki has done 
with its lean, heavy weight WX grade. 
7 
For grading purposes a lamb is defined as a sheep of less than twelve months of age, 
with sheep born in spring being termed lambs until the 30th September the following 
year. A summary of some of the lamb grades is given in table 1. 
Table 1 Export Carcase Grades: 
A y p T F 
Fat Almost Light Medium Heavy Excessive 
content devoid 
GR None YL-upto PL-over Over 12mm Over 
measurement and 6mmupto and up to 15mm 
incl. 6mm and incl. and incl. 
12mm 15mm 
YM-upto PM-over 
and incl. 7mmupto 
7mm and incl. 
12mm 
YXupto PX/PH 
and incl. over9mm 
9mm up to and 
WEIGHT: incl.12mm 
Less than A 
9.0 kg 
9.0kg and 
over-Up to YL PL TL FL 
and incl. 
12.5 k.g 
13.0kg and 
over-Up to YM PM 1M FM 
and incl. 
16.0kg 
16.5kg and 
over-Up to PX 
and incl. 
20.0kg 
YX TH FH 
20.S kg 
and over 
PH 
Source (N.Z. Meat Producer, 1985) 
Note: C and M grades are not shown on the above table.The very light grades (Alpha and Beta) have also 
been excluded and cannot be included in this study as there is no data available on their export. 
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8 
Grade A, Y, and P carcasses can be exported with no trimming of excess fat while 
grade T and F carcasses are trimmed of excessive fat prior to export. A loss of yield from 
the removal of excess fat and the increased labour costs involved in cutting and trimming 
carcasses, results in lower returns for grade T and F carcasses, with the most serious 
penalty occurring for carcasses graded F. 
Cutter carcasses (grade C) contain damaged or mutilated carcasses from any of the five 
fatness grades and are not eligible for export in carcase form, due to either trimming or 
mutilation, although intact cuts from these carcasses may be exported. Grade M, the 
manufacturing grade, includes carcasses that are too thin for export, are damaged, or 
weigh less than 9 k.g. but have a higher fat content then is allowable for the A grade. Cuts 
or carcases from grade M lambs may not be exported. As farmers have very little control 
over whether their stock will become C or M grade carcasses, and there is no data 
available on the export of C grade cuts these two grades have been excluded from this 
study. No data exists on the export of T and F grades so these have also been excluded. 
The grades in which margins will be analysed are grade A, PL, PX, PH, PM, YL and 
YM. 
The relative importance of the lamb grades being studied is shown in graphs one, two, 
and three. Graph one presents information on all of the grades slaughtered for export, 
while graph two and three only present information on the lamb grades being studied. 
Grade YX lambs make up a large proportion of the lambs not included in this study 
(others) for the 1987 to 1988 season. YX lambs cannot be considered for this study as as 
there is insufficient export data available on YX lambs during the early period of the 
study. Of particular significance to this study is the large volume and value of cuts, 
especially bone in cuts being exported as is shown in graphs two and three. From the 
export data it is impossible to tell from which grades cuts originate. 
- -··-' - - - -· - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
LAMBS SLAUGHTERED BY GRADE (000 tonnes) 
1987-1988 KILLING SEASON 
Graph 1 
PM 91 
---
PX 57 
---
---
YL 79 
---
---
T 7 
F 13 
if~YX 65 
C and M 31 
' ,. ! . .... . 
Graph 2 F.0.8. EXPORTS (000) TONNES 
1987-1988 KILLING SEASON 
BONE IN CUTS 
PH 
2 
PL 
18 
116 
PM 
48 
PX 
14 
YM 
34 
BONELESS CUTS 
22 
A 
5 
YL 
56 
--------------------
-" 
0 
---·· ·- -'"· - - - ·- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Graph 3 F.0.8. EXPORTS $(000) 
1987-1988 KILLING SEASON 
PX 
$18183 
PM 
$69831 
YM 
$48023 
YL 
$87960 
A 
$9895 
BONELESS CUTS 
$81961 
PH 
$1272 
PL 
$26909 
BONE IN CUTS 
$306778 
12 
2.2.1. MARKETING MARGINS: 
In this study the marketing margin of meat refers to the margin between the price 
farmers receive for lamb (schedule price) and the equivalent price of lamb, F.O.B. export 
As it is the price for meat that is being examined, payments for pelts, wool, and by-
products are excluded from this study. 
Tomek and Robinson (1981) point out that elementary texts on price theory say little 
about marketing margins both at farmgate and wholesale level. This is especially 
important in agricultural economics in terms of wholesale and farm prices. Farmers are 
often concerned about the cost of marketing services, especially in terms of the amount of 
the final consumer dollar which is involved in marketing, processing and wholesaling. 
However Campbell and Fisher (1982) explain that farmers often tend to overlook many 
services which are required to satisfactorily market agricultural products including 
insurance, risk bearing, interest on capital, and depreciation on assets required to market 
goods. 
Although the relationship between lamb prices at the farmgate and wholesale/retail 
level may be affected by changes in marketing arrangements and marketing costs, 
movements in prices at both ends of the marketing chain are primarily determined by: 
1. The level of demand including the level of export demand, and domestic demand 
factors such as prices of substitute meats, movement in incomes, population, and changes 
in tastes. The demand for lamb in the major importing countries relative to local supply 
has a significant impact on the level of prices on the New Zealand market as New 
Zealand exports approximately 90% of the lamb it produces. 
2. The level of supplies. Changes in the level of domestic supplies of meat are 
influenced by a wide range of factors including the price for meat itself, seasonal 
conditions, and relative returns to producers from alternative production, such as beef or 
wool (Blyth 1983). 
It has however been clearly established, that marketing costs are a major component of 
the wholesale price of meat (Houston 1962, Griffith 1974, Fisher 1981, Tomek and 
Robinson 1984). This suggests that changes in marketing costs exert an important 
influence over movements in marketing margins. The size and shape of the margins 
depends on the elasticity of the supply of marketing services. For example, if the supply 
of these services is perfectly elastic, there will be a constant margin as the demand for 
marketing services increases. 
Over the long term, developments in meat marketing will strongly influence the level 
of meat prices, the quality of meat, and the conditions under which it is exported. A 
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13 
number of factors influence long run increases in marketing costs, including changes in 
cost levels and increased provision of marketing services, for example, more precise 
specifications of meats and increasingly rigid hygiene requirements. Further processed 
meats, cuts, and fresh meat exports would be likely to have higher marketing margins due 
to the increased costs involved. Although these developments are likely to have an 
increasingly upward influence on marketing costs continued research and extension, 
aimed at assisting in the development and adoption of new technology and methods of 
market operation can minimise their effect on prices. 
2.2.1. Price Levelling and Averaging: 
Levelling and averaging are two effects which are often blamed for causing distortions 
in the pricing mechanism which determines schedule prices. In this study levelling refers 
to the practice of exporters holding their schedule prices relatively stable in times of 
fluctuating export returns. Averaging involves setting a lower margin on one lamb grade, 
while recovering losses by setting a higher margin on another grade. It is essentially a 
cross subsidisation between lamb grades. 
Parish (1967) provided a detailed discussion on price levelling and averaging, where he 
reviewed some of the previous research conducted, and then discussed price levelling and 
averaging from a theoretical viewpoint. He stated that levelling is practiced by the meat 
trade in many countries, and asked the question "are levelling and averaging a distinct 
phenomena or are they both a consequence of some general feature of retailers 
behaviour"? Griffith (1974) used an econometric model to examine if it is levelling, 
averaging, or a combination of both levelling and averaging that is preventing the the 
adjustment of current prices to changing market conditions. Stickiness of schedule prices, 
or the lag in adjustment of schedule prices to changes in export prices may lead to 
levelling. 
In Stigler's (1971) article on oligopolistic competition, he stated that short run price 
levelling often benefits the retailer. Stigler discussed three explanations of price levelling 
which results in the stability of retail prices. These same factors may also be used to 
explain the stability of lamb schedule prices in New Zealand, and the benefits exporters 
get from price levelling. 
Stigler' s three explanations of price levelling are: 
1. Long run considerations. 
Price changes may be the result of only temporary changes in supply and demand. If 
because of levelling, the market system fails to respond to such price changes, little harm 
will be done in the short term. Averaging of prices between lamb grades means 
14 
companies can maintain a competitive schedule price for a grade of lamb that is receiving 
low export returns in the short run, and therefore producers loyalty will not be lost to 
competitors. To maintain competitive schedule prices, grades receiving low export 
returns may be subsidised by grades receiving high export prices. 
2. The cost of price changes. 
Administrative advantages of levelling and averaging include the fact that exporters 
may be reluctant to change schedule prices because there are costs associated with these 
price changes. The cost of changing schedule prices involves more than the mental effort 
needed to derive a new price schedule as the effect of changed prices on supply needs to 
be predicted, and reactions from competitors considered. 
3. Administrative weaknesses in collusion. 
An individual meat company would no doubt be prepared to vary his schedule prices 
below or above the average of his competitors if he felt that this would increase his 
profits. Houston (1962) concluded that one of the major causes for the general acceptance 
of price levelling in the retailer butcher scene in Britain over the season, is that traders 
fear price wars. If New Zealand meat companies are competitive, they may keep their 
schedule prices relatively close together, and not fluctuate them greatly, even in time of 
fluctuating export returns.This would lead to price levelling, and maybe averaging. 
Not only exporters benefit from stable schedule prices, many farmers may also prefer 
the stable prices that result from price averaging and levelling to unstable prices. If there 
was long term price levelling resulting in more stable schedule prices, farmers would be 
able to plan production in advance. If schedule prices were guaranteed for later in the 
season (which would be likely to require price levelling and maybe averaging) producers 
could determine if it would be more profitable to sell lambs now, or to hold stock on the 
property in order to obtain heavier grades and more profitable weights. Another benefit of 
more stable prices is that infrequent price changes may carry more weight with producers 
than frequent price changes (Houston, 1962), as farmers may take more notice of 
schedule price changes when they are infrequent. A disadvantage of fluctuating prices is 
they may "engender production cycles which in turn means that excess resources may be 
devoted to certain commodities during some periods, while remaining under utilised 
during others" (Tomek and Robinson 1982). However with sufficient market information 
and no levelling or averaging, if prices are in error, the speculative behaviour of 
producers and buyers should move them back to equilibrium levels. 
There are however criticisms of price levelling and averaging because they lead to 
price distortions and therefore inefficiency. While levelling and averaging have important 
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administrative advantages, they distort the accurate transmission of prices from export to 
schedule levels. "Failure of the marketing system to reflect in consumer prices persistent 
seasonal differences in production costs can only be described as pricing distortion" 
(Parish 1968). While Parish is talking about the interaction of consumer prices which are 
led by f anngate prices in Britain, we can say the same distortion would occur if schedule 
prices did not follow movements in export prices. 
Levelling and averaging distort price relationships, and hinder or prevent the proper 
mutual adjustment of supply and demand, which leads to misallocation of resources with 
a subsequent loss of economic efficiency. A pricing system that does not accurately 
communicate the quality preferences of the buyer by rewarding or penalising the 
producer for different lamb grades produced, impedes quality improvement and industry 
effectiveness. 
2.2.2.Pricing efficiency and the importance of market information: 
Williams et al. studied pricing efficiency in South East Queensland cattle auctions and 
stated that pricing efficiency refers to the accuracy with which markets reflect the true 
supply and demand conditions in a market. An efficient pricing system accurately reflects 
perceived quality differences over time and space. A pricing system that fails to do this is 
inefficient in that producers will not be paid the true value of their product, and 
consequently the market system will be unable to carry out its role of efficient resource 
allocation. Efficient prices should provide signals about resource scarcity and reflect 
consumer preferences. Levelling and averaging lead to pricing inefficiency as they distort 
market signals. 
Information is central to an efficient operation of livestock markets. An efficient 
pricing system contains all necessary information about preferences of buyers and the 
availability of the product to enable market participants to make optimal buying and 
selling decisions at both a point and time in the future, given the market situation. While 
this study does not attempt to analyse the impact market information has on production 
decisions, the importance of the fact that participants should have easy access to 
information must be stressed. 
In Phillips (1968) review of marketing he considered information to be an important if 
not fundamental part of the marketing process. Adomowicz et al. (1984) studied pricing 
efficiency in Canadian hog markets and indicated the essential role of information, stating 
that "one of the main functions of an efficient marketing system is to facilitate the flow of 
information. The prices resulting from the flow should accurately reflect the supply and 
demand situation". Both buyers and producers can benefit from market information. 
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Producers should be able to use schedule prices to obtain a clearer picture of the strengths 
and weaknesses of various sectors in the market. It is here that buyers preferences should 
be reflected in differing prices for different grades of lambs in different parts of the 
country. Producers can use this information to decide whether it is more likely to be 
profitable to sell animals at their current weight and grade, or to condition them to obtain 
a better grade, and/or a more heavy weight. One thing that of course market news cannot 
do is insure that market will be used with equal intelligence by farmers who receive it. 
To summarise while levelling and averaging distort the transmission of prices between 
wholesale and f armgate levels, the damage they cause is balanced by many short term 
benefits. Even if schedule prices indicate market demand (as they should in the absence 
of price levelling and averaging), the efficient operation of New Zealand lamb markets 
requires producers to have easy access to information on the schedule prices paid by 
exporters. Research is being continually conducted to examine the nature of price 
transmissions, and marketing margins for meat. 
2.3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH CONDUCTED: 
In recent years there has been considerable research in which margin models have 
been used to describe and predict changes in marketing margins, however there has been 
no research on price differentials for margins between different livestock grades. 
Gardiner (1974) used mathematical models and derived theoretical equations to find 
simultaneous equilibrium in the retail food, farm output, and marketing services models. 
Gardiner stated that no simple pricing role (i.e. a fixed margin, a percentage margin or a 
combination of the two) accurately depicts the difference between farm price and retail 
price. This is because these prices move together in different ways depending on whether 
price movements originate from the retail demand or farm supply, side, or a shift in the 
supply of marketing inputs. 
Other studies like Fisher (1980) have looked at how farm prices change as a result of 
changing marketing margins. Fisher was however only concerned with cases where the 
change in marketing margins is the result of an exogenous shift in supply of marketing 
services. A theoretical approach was used to show that for most agricultural products, the 
major adjustment to changes in marketing margins will be made to farm prices. Farmers 
therefore have a strong economic interest in promoting efficiency in the service sector. 
MacArthur's (et al. 1985) study of price transmission in Canada examined the links 
both vertically (between levels in marketing channels), and horizontally (between market 
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areas), for beef and pork. One of the major relationships of interest to the producer, is the 
time lag that exists between a price change at one level and subsequent price changes at 
other levels. The length of time for prices to be transmitted along the marketing channel 
has implications for pricing efficiency within the channel, and a lag in adjustment to price 
changes may cause levelling. Information about the lag-lead relationship between price 
changes at different levels of the marketing channel gives more knowledge of the pricing 
efficiency associated with these products, and provides some information as to whether or 
not the marketing mechanism is working adequately, at least in respect to time. 
MacArthur ~ ill found that farrngate prices lead retail prices, as the farmgate demand 
curve is shifted by wholesaler anticipation of retail price changes. The result does not 
agree with theory which states if farmgate demand is a derived demand, retail prices 
should lead, followed by wholesale prices, with the demand at the farmgate shifting later 
(Tomek and Robinson, 1982). In this study I am assuming that meat exporting comJ>anies 
as a whole control their margin and that farmgate demand is a derived demand. 
Very little research has been conducted that examines the nature of price transmissions 
between different meat types, or meat grades. Woodward (1968) tested data for price 
levelling and averaging by simple regression, and for price levelling by stimulation and 
spectral techniques. He however ignored relationships between different meat types and 
the independent nature of market participants behaviour, as well as lags in the system and 
the effects of marketing costs. Marceau (1967) developed a quarterly regression model 
that tested for price levelling and wage turnover effects for meat in New South Wales. 
Single equation methods were used to estimate the required parameters. As Marceau's 
( 1967) regression equations only took into account the actual meat being examined in 
each equation, price averaging could not be tested for. 
In his study of Sydney meat marketing margins, Griffith (1974) developed a model 
containing aspects of Marceau's work, but also including components of margin models 
developed by Yandle (1968), Barr and Gale (1973) and Fuller and Ladd (1961). Models 
were developed for both wholesale and retail margins for pork, beef mutton and lamb . 
Griffiths regression equation for lamb was of the form: 
MWL = f(PAL, CWS, LPAL, MWB, MWM, MWP, 1L) 
where MWL = Wholesale margin Lamb 
PAL = Auction Price Lamb 
CWS = Wholesale Cost Sheep 
LAPL = Lagged Auction Price Lamb 
MWL = Wholesale Margin Beef 
MWM = Wholesale Margin Mutton 
MWP = Wholesale Margin Pork 
and 1L = Turnover Lamb 
Similar models were developed for other meats. 
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His results showed that wholesale margins were negatively related to current auction 
prices and positively related to lagged auction prices. This result suggested short run price 
levelling with longer term adjustment of wholesale margins to trends in auction prices, 
and basically agreed with comparable results from Woodward (1968). Price averaging 
also occurred at the wholesale level. 
Criticisms of Griffith's (1974) study include those made by Naughtin and Quigley 
( 1979) who stated that a major deficiency in the studies of Griffith (197 4) and Marceau 
(1967) was the lack of an explicit link between the formation of a marketing margin and 
the profit maximising of butchers. Dusenberry (1968) discussed the problems associated 
with using aggregate economic variables to test micro level behaviour. He stated that 
derived aggregate relationships do not hold for ordinary firms and there are two 
principles to be observed when testing hypothesis about aggregate behaviour. These are: 
1. Every hypothesis ought to be stated in terms of behaviour of the individual firm 
2. Hypotheses ought to be tested against data which indicates the behaviour of 
individual firms. 
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Due to the problems of obtaining data from individual firms and the desire to study the 
aggregate behaviour of meat marketing margins these factors cannot be considered for 
this study. 
Naughtin and Quigley (1979) attempted to model the pricing behaviour of retail 
butchers on a micro level basis using theory developed by Holton (1957) and Holdren 
(1960) in the supermarket context. Na ugh tin and Quigley assumed kinked demand 
curves, so when prices are high, demand will be more elastic. Conversely, demand will be 
less elastic when prices fall.They concluded that averaging and levelling may not just 
occur in the short run but also in periods of more than one quarter. Again, this approach 
cannot be considered here due to the difficulties of obtaining data and the desire to study 
the aggregate behaviour of marketing margins. 
In order to analyse monthly marketing margins for pork on the Sydney market Griffith 
and Duff (1989) modified Griffith's (1974) model to include a lagged dependent variable 
and risk variable. A risk factor may influence the marketing margins for New Zealand 
lambs by grade, and therefore should be discussed. Sandmo(1971) and McCall (1967) 
examined price uncertainty and risk, and found that a competitive firm under price output 
uncertainty, will produce less then the same firm without risk providing it is risk averse. 
Other papers have also examined the output price risk of marketing margins including 
Brorsen et al.(1985) who determined the effect of changes on output price risk on 
marketing margins in the U.S. wheat market. Brorsen et al. (1985) used theoretical 
models to show that if marketing firms are competitive and decreasingly absolute risk 
averse, then an increase in price risk results in higher than expected marketing margins. 
They used empirical evidence to support their claims. In Griffith and Duff's (1989) model 
price levelling occurred while price averaging did not. The risk variable did not prove 
significant, and for this reason has not been considered for this study. 
No previous research appears to have been published which examines the margins for 
different grades of meat. Marketing margin models like those developed by Griffith 
(1974) and Griffith and Duff (1989) may however be modified in an attempt to do this. 
• 
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Chapter 3 
MODEL SPECIFICATION: 
3.1.SPECIFICATIONS OF THE MODEL USED: 
The model incorporates aspects of Griffith's (1974) meat marketing margin model. As 
this model analyses different meat grades, meat grade margins have been substituted into 
the model in place of meat type. A lagged dependent variable has also been included. 
Grades of meat to be analysed are A, PL, PX, PH, PM, YM, and YL, with the model 
being repeated for each of the 7 grades of meat being analysed. 
Model specifications are: 
where: the subscript i represents the grade of meat being analysed 
and M· 1 = Monthly Wholesale margin for each lamb grade, or the 
difference between the F.O.B. export price of lamb and the schedule price paid to 
farmers in cents/kilogram. 
Pi = Monthly F.O.B. export prices of lamb gradei in c/kg 
Pit-l = Monthly lagged F.O.B. export price for lamb grade i inc/kg. 
Mit-l = Lagged Monthly margins on the grade of lamb being 
analysed inc/kg. 
Mj = Monthly margins for all other grades of lambs being studied 
except grade ~ in c/kg. 
MC = Monthly marketing cost. As no information is available for 
wholesale costs for grade a quarterly proxy is used.This is the Producer Price Index 
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for wages in the private sector for food, beverages and tobacco. The index used had 
a base value of 1000 in the quarter ended Dec 1985. 
Si = Monthly slaughterings for lamb gradei in 1000 kg. 
VC = Total monthly F.O.B. export value of lamb cuts in $(000). 
This includes both fresh and frozen, and boneless and bone in lamb cuts which may 
have originated from any lamb grade. 
The sources of data are presented in appendix 1. 
Current export prices (Pi) are present to test the hypothesis that schedule price levelling 
for each grade of lamb does not occur on a monthly basis. Without levelling marketing 
margins remain relatively constant, and do not fluctuate in response to movements in 
export prices. With levelling, at times of high export prices a high margin (Mi) is 
expected while during times of low export prices a low margin is likely. Levelling 
implies margins rise as export prices rise, therefore a positive coefficient is expected for 
Pi. As margins are not likely to change the full extent that export prices do, the coefficient 
is likely to be less then one. 
A negative coefficient on the lagged export price suggests the longer term coincidental 
adjustment of wholesale margins to trends in export prices. Previous studies, such as 
those undertaken by Marceau (1967), Griffith (1974), and Griffith and Duff (1989) used 
auction prices rather than export prices as the variable to test for price levelling, because 
auction prices were the price from which wholesalers based their margins. This gave rise 
to a negative coefficient on auction price rather than the positive coefficient we would 
expect for Pj, if price levelling is occurring in this model. The lagged auction price for 
previous studies is also assumed to have the opposite sign from which we would expect 
for lagged export prices. In this example New Zealand exporters receive a price for their 
exports and then develop their margins from this, therefore an elastic export demand is 
assumed. 
As the model is a complex dynamic structure with lags, multipliers and not coefficients 
should be used to interpret the effect of export price changes and the long run effects of 
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changes in any variable. Short and long run multipliers have been derived to examine the 
way that schedule prices change in response to changes in export prices. A long run 
multiplier for the changes in margins with respect to price has also been determined. 
The multipliers were derived as follows: 
~ =a+ bPi + cPit-l + d.Mit-l + eMj + ™C + gSi +hVC (1) 
~=(Pt Fi) 
where a is the constant, Pi is the export price, and Fi is the schedule price paid to farmers 
for lamb grade i· 
Assuming that the margins for other grades, wholesale costs, slaughterings, and the value 
of cuts are constant, equation (1) can be simplified to: 
PicFit =a+ bPit + cPit-1 + d(Pit-1-Fit-1) (2) 
Rearranging equation (2) gives: 
-Fit= a+ (b-l)Pit + cPit-l + d(Pit-i-Fit-l) (3) 
Differentiating gives: 
dFit = -(b-1) = 1-b (the short run schedule price multiplier) 
dPit 
This shows the effect that changes in export prices have on schedule prices in the short 
run (periods of one month or less). 
Long run multipliers can also be derived. In the long run assume a stable state therefore 
Pit = Pit-1 and ~t = Mit-1 · To derive the long run schedule price multiplier rearrange 
equation (3) to: 
Pi-Fi= a+ bPi + cPi + d(Pi-Fi) (4) 
rearranging (4) gives: 
-Fi =a+(b+c+d-l)Pi (5) 
(d-1) 
and then differentiating results in: 
dF· = c+d+b-1 
-1 
dPi (d-1) 
(6) 
(the long run schedule price multiplier). 
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The long run multiplier for margin changes is derived as follows: 
Mi= a+ bPi + cPi + dMi 
Mi = a + (b + c )Pi 
(1-d) 
and by differentiation: 
dMi = b + C 
dPi (1-d) 
(the long run margin multiplier) 
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The use of coefficients is satisfactory to interpret the results for short run behaviour of 
the variables~· MC, Si and VC. 
A significant long run, schedule multiplier of near zero and margin multiplier of close 
to one implies that long run levelling of schedule prices is occurring. With levelling, 
margins change, increasing when export prices rise, and decreasing when they fall, 
therefore a positive coefficient is likely for the long run margin multiplier. The long run 
schedule price and margin multipliers essentially measure the same thing, that is the way 
margins (and therefore schedule prices) respond to long run export price changes. 
Without levelling, schedule price changes will follow export price changes, and the long 
run schedule multiplier will be close to one. The margin will stay stable in times of 
fluctuating export returns and schedule prices will fluctuate with export prices. 
Averaging involves setting a lower/higher margin on one meat grade while recouping 
losses/gains by setting higher/lower margin on another meat grade or grades. The 
hypothesis that there is no price averaging, is tested for by including the margins for other 
grades of lamb in each of the 7 equations. If a significant coefficient exists for any Mj, 
then averaging will be occurring between it and Mi. For example, if the model being used 
to analyse grade PX's margin, and significant negative coefficients are present for the 
variables MYL and MPL (the margins for grade PL and YL) then the margins from grade 
PL and YL will be being used to subsidise grade PX margins. This would be the case if 
the wholesaler sets a low margin and therefore a high schedule price on grade PX, which 
') 
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is cross subsidised by MYL and MPL. A positive coefficient would mean the opposite is 
occurring. 
A monthly lagged dependent variable ( ~t-l) has been included as a result of a partial 
adjustment assumption. Research suggests that marketing chains do not completely adjust 
their pricing or production decisions in one period as a response to a price change. This 
may be due to costs, capital or other constraints (Doran and Guise 1984). If the previous 
months marketing margin has an significant impact on this months margin, a significant 
positive coefficient will be present for (~t-1 ). 
Theory suggests that the cost of providing marketing services should be related to the 
marketing margin. A proxy for marketing costs is included to check if as marketing costs 
increase, marketing margins rise. If marketing costs influence marketing margins, a 
positive coefficient will be likely to exist, as an increase in the price of wholesale 
marketing costs will result in higher marketing margins and therefore higher export, or 
lower schedule prices. 
The hypothesis that a high number of lambs slaughtered will not effect marketing 
margins is tested for by the inclusion of a monthly slaughterings (Si) variable. A high 
level of turnover might be expected to reduce average fixed costs and therefore average 
costs per kilogram of meat exported. If this occurs, and the reduction in costs will result 
in a lowering of margins, and the coefficient for slaughterings will be significant and 
negative. 
Export cuts represent a large proportion of the value and volume of lamb exported. 
Cuts come from the lamb grades being analysed as well as grade YX, F, C, and T 
carcases. Due to increases in costs, including more intensive labour, increased processing, 
and increased loss of tissue, it is likely that there will be increased marketing margins for 
cuts but as no data exists on exactly which lamb grades these cuts come from, their 
margins can not be calculated. This means the exact effect cuts originating from a 
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specified lamb grade have on schedule price for that lamb grade is unable to be 
determined. 
The hypothesis being tested checks whether the changing value of total cuts influences 
the margins offered for carcasses. The value of cuts exported has been increasing in 
recent years. It may be expected that an increase in the value of cuts could lead to an 
averaging process which would allow margins to fall and schedule prices to rise relative 
to export prices. For example, if an increase in the value of cuts leads to higher returns to 
producers for any lamb grade, averaging will be taking place with cuts. However with 
competitive markets this would not be expected. 
If the demand for cuts is an independent new demand, then aggregate demand will 
increase, but it would not pay exporters to alter the margins for carcase meats, which 
represent the actual cost of marketing meat in a competitive environment. Even if there is 
substitution it would only pay to reach an equilibrium where the prices charged for both 
cuts and carcases reflect the relative price of processing above a schedule price, which 
represents the opportunity cost of acquiring meat. Thus, the changing export mix would 
not be expected to influence the margins for carcase meats in perfectly competitive 
markets, and in the absence of any averaging behaviour. If a significant negative 
coefficient exists for the VC variable in any equation it is likely that cuts will be 
subsidising schedule prices for that lamb grade, with schedule prices being maintained 
above market equilibrium levels. 
To summarise, the null hypotheses being tested are: 
1. Ho: Price levelling does not have a significant influence on the marketing margins for 
different grades of lamb in New Zealand. 
2. Ho: Price averaging does not significantly influence the marketing margins for 
different lamb grades in New Zealand. 
3. Ho: Marketing margins are unrelated to the cost of providing marketing services. 
4. Ho: Marketing margins are not related to the monthly slaughters (by weight) for each 
grade of lamb. 
5. Ho.Lamb cuts (both bone in and bone out) have no effect on marketing margins. 
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By examining these hypothesis the effects that different variables have on margins can 
be examined, and if the export demand is assumed to be elastic, the subsequent changes 
in schedule prices can be determined .. 
3.2.METHOD OF ESTIMATION: 
The model is estimated in linear form with coefficients expressing the absolute change 
in the margin in c/kg for each one unit change in the variables. Previous research that has 
examined monthly or quarterly changes in marketing margins for meat, including that 
conducted by Yandle (1968), Fuller and Ladd (1961) and, Griffith (1974) has also 
estimated models in linear form. 
Two stage least squares (2 S.L.S.) is the estimation technique used. This solves the 
problem of simultaneous equation bias that would occur if ordinary least squares was 
used as an estimation technique, as margins are determined simultaneously. The two 
stage least squares is a special case of the instrumental variable technique in which the 
"best" instrumental variables are used. Kennedy (1985) suggested combining all 
exogenous variables to create a combined variable to act as a "best" instrumental variable. 
Since it is equivalent to indirect least squares, in the just identified case, 2 S.L.S . is 
usually applied uniformly to all identified equations in the system.The instruments used 
are Pi, Pit-l• Si, PXC, WC, and C (the constant). 
In Durbin and Watson (1951) the authors warned that the Durbin Watson statistic did 
not provide an adequate test for the AR(l) error process in the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable. Durbin(1970) proposed the use of the Durbin's h statistic to test for 
autocorrelation errors in the model. All equations are tested for autocorrelation using 
Durbin's h test. 
The data consists of 36 monthly observations over the period from October 1985 to 
October 1988. 
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Chapter 4 RESULTS: 
This section reports on estimates of the 7 wholesale margin models as shown in table 3 
on page 28. The bold figures are coefficients while the light numbers below are t scores. 
An asterisk beside at score indicates significance at the 5% level. In all estimates R2 are 
relatively high. There is no evidence of significant autocorrelation when tested with 
Durbin's h test. Correlations between Mi and Pi,and are high, but this is to be expected, 
and should not lead to model misspecification. The highest simple correlations between 
other variables are 0.72 between MYMt-l and PYMt-l• and 0.70 between MPXt-l and 
PPXt- l · The correlations between existing variables seems satisfactory. 
4.1 Price Levelling: 
In all 7 equations wholesale margins are positively related to current export prices and 
negatively related to past export prices. Both variables are significant in all cases. 
Emphasis should not be placed on these coefficients, but on multipliers interpret the 
effect export price changes have on schedule prices, and long run marketing margins. 
Multipliers estimated for each lamb grade are presented in table 2. 
Table 2 Estimates of Multipliers 
MULTIPLIERS MA MPL MPX MPH MPM MYL MYM 
LONG RUN dFi 
Schedule dPi 4.00 0.71 -0.06 -0.12 0.11 0.17 0.07 
SHORT RUN dFit 
Schedule dPit 0.12 0.19 -0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.16 0.04 
LONG RUN dMi 
Margin dPi -3.00 0.29 1.07 1.13 0.89 1.09 0.93 
Table 3 Coefficient estimates for Individual Meat Margins 
C p. I lpi<t-1) (Mit-1) IMA MPL 
MA 0.77 0.88 * -0.82* 1.02 * 0.06 
0.19 13.92 -8.32 12.57 0.68 
MPL 8.47 0.81* -0.58* 0.21 -0.08 
0.18 8.40 -3.69 1.44 -0.14 
MPX 55.46 1.02 * -0.57 * 0.5~ -0.09* -0.06 
1.96 24.83 -5.18 5.55 -2.27 -0.72 
MPH 40.1 1.01 * -0.65* 0.68* -0.10* -0.05 
1.25 29.36 -5.76 5.69 -2.49 -054 
MPM 3.28 0.90* -0.40* 0.44* -0.13* -0.02 
1.26. 8.32 -2.48 3.08 -2.34 -0.41 
MYL 50.16 0.84* -0.51* 0.5§. -0.02 0.11 
1.32 7.46 -2.65 2.88 -0.49 1.25 
MYM 99.6~ 0.96* -0.29* 0.28 -0.14* 0.05 
2.86 9.36 -2.18 2.04 -3.30 0.90 
Table 3 (continued) 
MYL MYM MC s. I vc 
MA -0.19 0.14 -0.01 -0.9~10·2 -0.3lx10·3 
-1.36 0.92 -0.40 2.07 -1.43 
MPL 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.69xl0-3 o.49x10·4 
1.45 0.16 -0.77 0.64 0.15 
MPX -1.11 0.01 0.01 o.21x10-3 -o.29x10·4 
-0.95 0.02 0.14 0.20 -0.15 
MPH 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.21xlo·2 -0.29x10·5 
0.07 -0.17 0.31 -1.12 0.01 
MPM 0.04 0.15 -0.01 0.16xl0-3 -0.15xlo·3 
0.40 1.58 -0.84 0.81 -0.95 
MYL 0.14 0.10 0.40xl0-3 -0.llxlo-3 
1.14 0.49 1.56 -0.57 
MYM -0.01 0.01 0.63x10·3 o.12x10·3 
-0.14 0.08 0.78 0.74 
... ,, 
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MPX MPH 
-0.02 0.01 
-0.42 0.16 
0.03 0.01 
-0.14 0.32 
0.05 
1.55 
0.01 
0.04 
-0.01 0.02 
-0.40 0.63 
0.03 -0.02 
-0.06 -0.62 
-0.04 -0.02 
-1.09 -053 
R2 Db 
0.94 -1.23 
0.86 -0.12 
0.96 0.09 
0.97 -1.35 
0.90 -0.29 
0.81 -0.12 
0.94 0.02 
MPM 
-0.17 
-1.10 
-0.01 
0.02 
0.22 
1.79 
0.21 
157 
-0.21 
-1.60 
0.15 
1.60 
F12.23 
48.82 
20.16 
81.68 
117.74 
29.83 
14.21 
48.80 
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In all cases short run multipliers show that significant short run price levelling is 
occurring. For most grades the short run price multipliers are close to zero indicating that 
levelling is almost complete, and that short run export price changes (over periods of one 
month or less) have very little impact on schedule prices. Export prices have a slight 
impact on schedule price for grades A, PL and YL, all of which are light lambs 
slaughtered early in the season. Due to the lack of other information available, exporters 
may be more reliant on export prices when determining schedule prices for these lamb 
grades. The results are comparable with previous research which shows short run price 
levelling occurs in the meat industry including that by Marceau(1967), Parish (1967), 
Woodward (1968), and Griffith (1974 and 1989). 
The long run margin multiplier yields results that are almost identical to the long run 
schedule price multiplier, which is to be expected, as the link is derived. This discussion 
will be mainly concerned with long run schedule multipliers as it is the changes in 
schedule price that this study is concerned with and therefore the schedule price 
multiplier is easier to interpret. Long run levelling of margins, and stabilisation of 
schedule prices is taking place in all grades with the exception of grade A and PL. While 
theory suggests that coefficients for long run schedule multipliers should not be negative, 
the negative coefficients for MPX and MPH are not significantly different from zero and 
therefore do not cause concern. 
A long run schedule multiplier of 4.00 for MA indicates that schedule prices are 
extremely responsive to long run changes in export prices for grade A lambs. The 
multiplier of 0.71 for MPL implies that in the long run, schedule prices change in 
response to export price changes and price levelling does not take place. As the multiplier 
of 0.71 for MPL is considerably less then that for MA, grade PL schedule prices are not 
as responsive to changes in export prices as grade A prices are. Long run levelling may be 
absent for the light grades, MA and PL because they are slaughtered early in the season. 
Exporters may rely more on previous months export prices when setting schedule prices, 
as killing seasons for these grades are very short, and as killing takes place early in the 
season, there may be a lack of other data on which to base schedules. Margins from 
.. 
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another light grade, YL, are the next most responsive to long term changes in export 
prices. 
The monthly margins, export prices, and schedule prices for the period of the study are 
shown in graphs four to ten. The fluctuation of export prices may be caused by a 
combination of factors including variability in the volume of monthly exports. To 
determine the exact cause of the fluctuations, further research would have to be 
conducted. In all cases the margins seem to move up and down in response to changes in 
the export price while schedule prices stay relatively constant. This indicates levelling 
and agrees with the empirical results. The graphs show that in months of low export 
returns, marketing margins may drop below zero for most grades, as exporters are selling 
meat at a lower price than which they bought it. These months may be when low volumes 
of exports are being sold and therefore the loss by exporters is not be great, or when 
excess stocks are being sold at a cheap price. Rather than reduce schedule prices, 
exporters may be prepared to accept a loss in order to maintain schedule prices at present 
levels, and avoid losing producers custom. During these periods it is possible that 
averaging may be taking place, with returns from wool, pelts and by-products being used 
to subsidise the losses or low returns, exporters are receiving for a grade of meat. 
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4.2 Price Averaging: 
The only significant instances of short run (over periods of one month or less) price 
averaging occur in the equations for MPH, MPX, MPM, and MYM with the variable 
MA. The results indicate that price averaging is not complete as none of the coefficients 
are plus or minus 1 or more. For each equation in which MA is significant, the 
coefficients on MA are negative, therefore it appears that the margin for grade A lambs is 
responsible for lowering MPH, MPX, MPM, and MYM. If export demand is assumed to 
be constant MA is responsible for a decreasing margins for lamb grades PH, PX, PM, 
and YM, and therefore increasing their schedule prices. A possible explanation of this 
result is that grade A lambs are very light and are mainly slaughtered early in the season. 
Exporters may be able to set higher margins on grade A lambs as competition for these 
lambs may not be intense, with many chains may not be operating early in the season. 
Graph four indicates the high margins for grade A lambs in comparison to the other 
margins shown in graphs five to ten. The high MA may result in excess returns which are 
used to subsidise the margins for lambs killed later in the season. This may help explain 
why the coefficients for the variable MA are insignificant for the equations PL and YL, as 
these are also very light lambs, mainly slaughtered when the killing season is beginning. 
The results are asymmetrical as averaging does not appear to be reversible. While 
grade A margins are subsidising the margins for grades PH, PX, PM, and YM these 
grades do not appear to have an impact on MA. The coefficients are very small, 
indicating that although they are significant MA only lowers the margins MPH, MPX, 
MPM, and MYM slightly. Considering the small volume of grade A lambs exported the 
effect per grade A lamb is more considerable. Coefficients on all other margins are not 
significant, and therefore averaging does not appear to be taking place. The long run 
multipliers for averaging are insignificant, but the significance of the lagged dependent 
shows that complex dynamic relationships between margins occur over time. 
4.3 Marketing Costs: 
Marketing costs show no significance for any equation. This is a surprising result as 
theory suggests that marketing costs should have a positive impact on marketing margins. 
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A likely reason for the insignificance of MC is the fact that real indicators are used, that 
do not change greatly compared with the nominal data used for other prices. The proxy 
used may not be a good indicator of wholesale marketing costs, as costs other than labour 
probably play an important part in the determination of wholesale marketing costs. The 
effect of long run changes in costs is likely to be more significant than the monthly 
changes tested for here. 
4.4 Slaughterings: 
The monthly slaughterings (throughput) variable does not prove significant for any 
lamb grade, with the exception of grade A. A negative coefficient for SA means that an 
increase in the volume of lamb slaughtered leads to lower marketing margins, and 
therefore higher schedule prices for grade A lambs. A possible reason for this is the fact 
that grade A lambs make up a large proportion of the lambs slaughtered early in the 
season. Increasing the throughput of grade A lambs may significantly increase the 
aggregate lamb throughput, and result in lower monthly average fixed costs, per grade A 
lamb. Later in the season aggregate slaughterings are made up of a wider variety of lamb 
grades and a greater volume of meat is slaughtered, therefore an increase in turnover for a 
specific lamb grade may only cause a relatively small increase in the aggregate turnover 
for a month. Monthly average fixed costs per kilogram of lamb slaughtered may therefore 
not decrease significantly. 
While this may be one argument why grade A lambs reduce average monthly fixed 
costs more than other lambs, the insignificant Si variable for other lamb grades does not 
necessarily mean that increased volumes of these lambs being processed do not lower 
average fixed costs, only that the differences are not passed onto the producer through 
higher schedule prices which would result in decreased margins. Section 4.3. suggests 
that short run changes in marketing costs are not transmitted to schedule price changes, as 
they do not appear to influence margins. A decrease in average fixed costs as a result of 
increases in slaughterings of a specific lamb grade may also not be transmitted to other 
levels in the marketing channel. 
40 
4.5 Lamb Cuts: 
The results show that the coefficient for the value of cuts is close to zero and 
insignificant in all equations. While all coefficients are very small, emphasis should not 
be placed on their size as this is likely to be effected by the units. Results indicate that 
margin for any lamb grade is not affected by the aggregate value of cuts therefore 
averaging does not appear to be taking place between the value of cuts and any lamb 
grades margin. To determine the exact effect that cuts originating from a specified lamb 
grade have on the margin for that grade, more information is necessary regarding the 
grades from which cuts originate, and cuts export value and volume for each grade. 
Currently this information is not collected. 
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Chapter 5: 
CONCULSIONS: 
5.1 IMPLICATIONS: 
In this study empirical evidence has been provided on the relationship between export 
prices and marketing margins for a number of lamb grades in New Zealand. This helps 
gain a better understanding of those factors which have a significant impact on margin 
behaviour, and therefore schedule prices. 
By far the greatest amount of concern with the meat marketing system has been aimed 
at the process of levelling and averaging (Griffith 1974). The major criticisms of levelling 
and averaging is that these practices distort resource allocation in the lamb industry, and 
therefore restrict farmers ability to efficiently plan production decisions on the basis of 
demand. 
The general conclusion of this study is that the transmission of supply and demand to 
schedule prices is distorted in the short run and in many cases in the long run, by price 
levelling. Levelling means that marketing margins of lamb meat follow trends in export 
prices. If export prices rise, margins rise while if export prices fall they fall, therefore 
trends in export prices are not reflected in schedule prices. The short run effect of the 
levelling is not great, as producers and exporters may in fact gain benefits from operating 
under a stable price regime, as unstable prices have been linked to inefficiencies in 
resource use. The benefits that short run price levelling have to both producers and 
exporters have been discussed in section 2.2.1. Overall short run levelling which 
stabilises schedule prices does not seem likely to affect the allocative function of 
producers to any great extent. 
Long run levelling is taking place with lamb grades PM, PX, PH, YM and YL. The 
implications of long run levelling are much more serious, as it is likely to distort resource 
allocation. Long run levelling may lead to long run averaging between lamb grades 
although this has not been determined in this study. If there is long run levelling leading 
to lower margins for grades, PM, PX, PH, YM, and YL, it is likely that some form of 
• .. 
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subsidisation would be necessary to maintain their schedule prices. This would distort 
production away from grades in market demand, and lead to rnisallocation of resources. 
There may be a relationship between long run levelling and short run averaging, as grade 
A lambs are being used to subsidise the schedule price for grade PM, PX, PH, and YM 
lambs in the short run. 
The government has been involved with price stabilisation schemes introduced in the 
past. This study implies that the government policies that lead to the stabilisation of 
schedule prices, and are aimed at stabilising producers incomes, may not be necessary. 
Levelling appears to be occurring without intervention. 
Results show that short run averaging is occurring, as grade A margins are being used 
to subsidise margins for grade PX, PM, PH, and YM lambs. This means schedule prices 
for grade A lambs are likely to be lower, while those for PX, PM, PH, PM and YM 
higher, than is economically efficient. Producers are therefore being diverted away from 
producing grade A lambs and encouraged to produce grade PX, PM, PH, and YM lambs. 
Averaging means prices are distorted from market determined levels and desirable 
adjustments in production are slowed down or prevented. 
In the short run changes in marketing costs do not appear to influence marketing 
margins. If monthly marketing cost changes are insignificant, this should not create 
problems, but if cost changes are significant and not passed onto producers as a result of 
changes in marketing margins a type of levelling will be taking place. With levelling the 
price transmission mechanism will not be working accurately as changes in marketing 
costs will not be transmitted to schedule prices. 
It appears that an increase in the slaughterings of grade A lambs, reduces average fixed 
costs, and that this reduction in costs leads to decreased margins. If the throughput for 
other lamb grades also significantly reduces average fixed costs, but these changes are not 
passed onto schedule prices through reduced margins, the pricing mechanism is not 
reflecting changes in costs and is therefore inefficient, as a type of levelling is occurring. 
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While the value of cuts exported has been increasing, the aggregate value of cuts does 
not appear to have an impact on marketing margins for any lamb grade. Averaging does 
not appear to be taking place between the the value of cuts and the margin of any lamb 
grade, therefore the market price transmission mechanism appears to be operating in a 
competitive manner with respect to cuts. 
Some of the factors that have not been analysed in this study because of the difficulty 
involved, or problems in obtaining data may also influence schedule prices. A brief 
discussion of some of the possible impacts that the activities of the Meat Industry 
Association, wool,pelts and by-products, and stocks may have on marketing margins is 
included in appendix 2. 
The problems involved in obtaining information for this study highlight the problems 
farmers have in getting data on which to base decisions. One way of shortening the 
reaction time of producers to changes in schedule prices may be to increase the 
accessibility of information. While in the early periods of this study it was very difficult 
to obtain company information, with many companies not publishing schedule prices this 
seems to have changed recently with private companies publishing and selling schedule 
information. Higher prices by certain meat companies may mean producers will shop 
around to gain the best deal. 
The results of this analysis could be utilised in conjunction with other models of the 
livestock and meat sector. They could be spliced onto a model that predicts monthly lamb 
prices by grade. An area worthy of further research, is the examination of the impact of 
changing export volumes of lamb on schedule prices. The model may be able to be 
modified to examine the effects that changing marketing margins have on schedule 
prices, or to analyse if averaging is taking place between the value of pelts or wool, and 
the schedule price, for a lamb grade or grades. 
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5.2. LIMITATIONS 
In this study considerable problems existed in obtaining consistent data. A lot of 
information is classified and therefore unattainable, such as the average lamb prices by 
grade which are collected by the Meat and Wool Boards Economic Service. Three 
different sources of schedule prices are used during the study, which may lead to 
inconsistency. 
Export statistics data not only includes the value of lambs sold by schedule, but also 
the export value of lambs farmers sell by other means such as by pooling. The use of 
aggregate export statistics data may limit the accuracy of the results, however the degree 
of error may not be great in a perfectly competitive environment as the per kilogram 
export returns from meat sold by schedule and other sources, such as by pooling, could 
be assumed to be equal. 
Payments for wool, pelts, and by-products are not included in this study. If averaging is 
taking place between the value for these products and a lamb grades margin, this would 
limit the accuracy of these results, as a relevant variable would be excluded. The impact 
of frozen stocks and domestic consumption should also be considered, but there is no 
information by grade on these factors. A potential source of error is that the proxy for 
costs is uninflated while other prices used are real. This may be the reason why marketing 
costs were insignificant. 
Rather then using current price and lagged price variables in the same equation it may be 
better to use a weighted average of past export prices. This would mean that all 
adjustments to price changes do not occur in this period or the next period, and would 
eliminate some of the problems of containing a price variable and lagged price variable in 
the same equation. 
Finally, there were some unattended to econometric problems. Although the 
correlations between some Pit- l and Mit-l variables may cause problems with 
multicollinearity they are accepted as this form of the equation brought about best overall 
model specifications. As the contemporaneous covariances between the 2 S.L.S. error 
terms are non zero it may have been more asymptocally efficient to use 3 S.L.S. A model 
. ..; 
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that directly depicts factors responsible for changes in schedule prices may better explain 
schedule price changes, than a model that examines marketing margins and therefore 
schedule price changes indirectly. 
5.3. CONCLUSION 
This study involved the analysis of monthly changes in schedule prices for various 
lamb grades from the period October 1985 to October, 1988. To do this, changes in 
marketing margins were analysed. To test the impact of a number of factors on marketing 
margins, models used by Griffith (1974) and Griffith and Duff (1989) were adapted. 
The results show that there is short run price levelling in all grades, with long run price 
levelling also present in all grades with the exception of A and PL. Averaging is taldng 
place with grade A lambs being used to subsidise schedule prices for PM, PX, PH and 
YM lambs, meaning schedule prices for these lambs are likely to be higher then market 
determined levels. The effect of marketing costs did not prove significant. This result was 
surprising, and probably because the proxy used was not a good indicator of marketing 
costs, and short run, not long run changes in costs were analysed. The level of throughput 
did not significantly effect margins, except for grade A lambs where an increase in 
throughput reduced marketing margins. For other lamb grades although throughput may 
reduce average fixed costs, these changes did not appear to be passed on to the producer 
through higher schedule prices. While the aggregate value of cuts did not appear to alter 
the schedule price for any lamb grade, the effect that the value of cuts obtained from a 
specified lamb grade have on the margin for that lamb grade is unable to be determined 
due to the limited availability of information on cuts. 
Firms involved in the exporting of lamb, face considerable short run variability in the 
prices they receive for lamb. This study shows that schedule prices are much more stable 
as a result of stabilisation by exporters of schedule prices (price levelling). 
To conclude, although short run price levelling occurs, it does not appear to greatly 
interfere with the effectiveness of price signals transmitted from the exporter to the 
producer. The same may not be true for long run levelling. Averaging results in 
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mis allocation of resources as producers base their production decisions on schedule prices 
which are higher than market determined levels for grade PM, PX, PH, and YM lambs. 
This exploratory study is sufficient to establish the broad parameters that influence the 
transmission of prices, from wholesale to farmgate level, but further exploration is 
necessary in order to fully understand the price formation process. 
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Pi, Pit-1: New Zealand Department of Statistics. External trade monthly summary list of 
i.:·_. , \ e_xpo_fJ.£.by_ a<!_unJry of destination. 
MC: New Zealand Department of Statistics. Consumer Price Index. 
Si New Zealand Meat Producers Board unpublished data. Export Livestock 
-:.. ~ ·-: .. . ,S~aughterings (bone in weight) on a weekly basis. Average monthly prices are 
used. 
VC: New Zealand Department of Statistics. External trade monthly summary list of 
exports by country of destination. 
Mf Marketing margins are the difference between the F.O.B. export price of lambs and 
the schedule price paid to farmers.The schedule prices used are for bare meat 
only, with an additional payment being made for the wool and pelt. In all cases 
premiums are added to schedule prices if they are applicable. There are 
considerable problems in obtaining an average monthly schedule price for each 
lamb grade being studied. As no data was available for the whole period of the 
study, three different sources are used. The sources are: 
October 1985 to March 1987. Meat Exporter Producer payments published weekly by 
. 
the New Zealand Meat Producers Board. An un weighted average is taken 
between North and South Island Prices. The prices issued here are only 
indicative of the prices being paid to farmers. The Meat Producers board 
stopped publishing schedules in March 1987. 
April 1987 to September 1987: During this period there is no published average prices 
paid to farmers. Even individual companies schedule prices are hard to obtain. 
Information used is from the Meat Schedule Monitor published by the New 
Zealand Meat Producers Board on a weekly basis.Monthly unweighted 
averages for the companies Alliance, AFFCO, Challange, and Richmond are 
used. 
53 
October 1987 to October 1988: Unpublished data obtained from the Meat and Wool 
, I ,. 
Boards Economic Service. The net data represents the amount farmers would 
'J;·' -~' r-eciiveli ort:!:a _pe.t head basis(includj.~g premjums). Deductions. ru:e made to 
. ''•Jl1,,1ll ·,· .. --1. ;'l- . ·' ' _. '.... . . ·. )'!~ ·, . ' - ' 
take account of the following costs and make the data,~onsisient_wJth other 
' - l .: { i ' -·:-! ... ' . .:.. i 
· ;1 ::r: scheduleprices-J_;Fhedeductio_~,sare;fm\ ,-:<-r. .. , .. ~:,:·' ,-" ,-'. ~-.< ~: ~j , ,- . 
·.\ ' 1 .• . . .J J. ~ 1 I. f { • t .. l J 1 ,' I l 
Killing charges an'a freezi'ng r-afos . ' ., ' ·'- . i' I. ; ( , I' . f 
. _ · .. .--. r1:J. · n · I/· _ ut1 , 
:-x,.J l.') 'Iri' .. ,-J ,y · • . w1em spectton c-harges' .'1:r~ .. '- ·, .c.::• r' ,,. f:.·,, .. .• 
• • [ ." • l .. ~, 
D:rll~tng/ Aaminisiration <WStsj[ • 'L,: '! 
Levies 
· Transport 'from works io port · 
. ' .. ,,.. . 
.:-.Again, averag<fmonthly data was calculated and used. 
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APPENDIX 2: 
• f , 
A bri~f discussion of three factors not analysed in this study that may influence 
' 'I • J1) • ,, 
lamb marketing margins: 
This section gives a brief discussion of some of the poski}?le impa~ts that three 
activities that are not included in this study have on mark~iliig Illargiqs. ··,, · 1!: 1 .,·: 
Although the activities of the M.I.A and coordinated mark~ting activities :h~~/not been 
f . • \· 
';, "j •• ' 
examined in this study, they may have important influences Qn the form~tion of schedule 
prices, and therefore the implications should be discussed. Using export statistics ~~r the 
year ended June 1987, it can be shown that bone in exports which were allocated. t~the 
market on a pro-rata basis accounted for 65% of total exports. If other single seller 
markets are also included 72% of export markets could be consid~red to be con.trq~led. 
When exports to other E.E.C. countries which are also closely monitored because of 
voluntary restraint agreements are included, this figure rises to 84% of New Zealands 
bone in lamb exports (Zwart and Martin 1988). Exporters argue that these arrangements 
do not effect the determination of schedule prices and may in fact make exporters more 
competitive, as to gain a quota for next season meat companies must price their schedules 
high enough to attract competitors stock. While coordinated marketing activities may be a 
reason for the stabilisation of export prices, in a competitive environment this should not 
effect marketing margins. 
The effects that payments for wool, pelts, and by-products have on Mi also have not 
been examined in this study, but may play an important part in the price transmission 
mechanism. It is possible that averaging may be taking place with pelts, wool, and by-
products being used to subsidise meat prices in times of low export returns, and visa-
versa. If the pricing system is efficient the schedule price for meat should be determined 
by the interaction of supply and demand for meat and not influenced by the price of wool 
or pelts, as producer and export payments for these products are separate from meat 
returns. As there is not a separate payment to producers for by-products, any returns over 
and above costs should be reflected in an increase in schedule prices if the market is 
competitive. The misallocation of resources caused by a short term averaging process 
t I ~COLN UN I VE~S I TY~l Tl'KAIT 
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with pelts may not be great, as there is little the producer can do about the condition of 
his pelts, and the producer will still be receiving similar aggregate returns for lamb. With 
wool an averaging process may cause be harmful as it may influence a producers decision 
on whether to shear before slaughter, and therefore result in a misallocation of resources. 
··Most lambs are killed and then frozen and stored. Exporters could use these stocks to 
st.abilise prices, selling increasing volumes of stocks when demand is high and storing 
more lambs when demand is low. While this could be a reason for the stabilisation of 
export prices, this study can not determine the effect on schedule prices. 
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